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1 Introduction
A correlated equilibrium (Aumann (1974, 1987)) for a normal form game is a
Nash equilibrium of an extended game, where the extension consists of a corre-
lation device. The outcomes achieved by this solution concept typically improve
upon Nash equilibrium outcomes (Moulin and Vial (1978)). The interpretation
of correlated equilibrium requires a (fictitious) mediator; thus it would be de-
sirable to construct a communication process among the players only. Indeed, a
recent advancement in the literature (Aumann and Hart (2003), Barany (1992),
Ben-Porath (1998, 2003), Forges (1990), Gerardi (2004), Gossner (1998), Goss-
ner and Vieille (2001), Krishna (2005), Lehrer (1996), Lehrer and Sorin (1997),
Urbano and Vila (2002)) on communication in games considers the following
question: can any correlated equilibrium of a given normal form game be gener-
ated as the equilibrium outcome of a communication process among the players?
This approach certainly addresses the above desideratum, to the extent that the
communication process does not involve the mediator.
A significant body of this literature tries to “implement” a correlated equi-
librium of a given game. The typical main result in this literature suggests
that the mediator can indeed be replaced. That is, depending on the specific
set-up, any correlated equilibrium distribution of a given game (with mild as-
sumptions) can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium outcome of a well-specified
communication scheme. In this sense, a correlated equilibrium can therefore be
“implemented”. The literature also claims, as a corollary to the main theorem,
that the set of all correlated equilibria (for a restricted class of games) can also
be “implemented”.
Although these results are no doubt of importance in our understanding of
communication in games and the notion of correlated equilibrium, we argue in
this paper that the above mentioned literature fails to highlight a couple of key
issues regarding “implementation”. These papers do not really appeal to the
notions of the “theory of implementation”. Possibly as a result of this, two
problems creep in.
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First, the literature does not try to achieve full implementation. That is, it
does not address the issue concerning the potential problem of multiplicity of
equilibrium. It may be easily conceived that a communication scheme meant
to generate one particular correlated equilibrium distribution as an equilibrium
outcome may have multiple Nash equilibria leading to different outcomes. Ray
(2002) hints at the general difficulty in implementing a direct correlated equilib-
rium by showing an example where the disobedient strategy profile constitutes
an equilibrium that in fact Pareto-dominates the obedient strategy profile and
considers non-canonical devices for which the disobedient strategy profile ceases
to be an equilibrium.
Second, the way the recent literature claims the whole set of correlated
equilibria to be implementable (for example, Corollary 1 in Gerardi (2004))
does not conform with our understanding of the notion of implementation either.
The unmediated game forms used to achieve different correlated equilibria are
different. To implement the set of correlated equilibria, one should aim to
construct a single game form whose set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides
with the set of correlated equilibrium distributions in question. Clearly, this
has not been achieved by the recent literature, although it is of course worth
noting that earlier (Barany (1992), Forges (1990)) the research agenda in this
area was indeed to search for such a universal mechanism. The recent literature
has deviated from this earlier direction, overlooking this important distinction.
This paper appeals directly to the ingredients of the theory of implemen-
tation and takes a direct approach to check whether a specific correlated equi-
librium distribution can be implemented. We formulate an implementation
problem in which the social choice function associates with every payoff matrix
(a normal form game) a particular desirable correlated equilibrium distribution
of the game and ask whether this function is fully implementable or not. We
obtain a negative result. We show that many social choice functions that choose
such a correlated equilibrium distribution do not satisfy Maskin monotonicity,
and therefore cannot be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.
We illustrate our approach and the result by considering a parametric ver-
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sion of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium
distributions. Our paper provides a precise answer to the problem of full im-
plementation of a particular correlated equilibrium in a wide class - it cannot
be achieved. Of course, as follows from the work of Barany (1992) and Forges
(1990), the whole set of correlated equilibrium distributions can be implemented
by virtue of a universal mechanism. This is a distinction to be highlighted,
since it says that while the entire set of correlated equilibrium distributions
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium outcomes of a communication mechanism
among the players, the same cannot be said about specific correlated equilib-
rium distributions because of the multiple equilibrium difficulty. For a wide class
of correlated equilibrium distributions, no mechanism exists that fully imple-
ments them. This suggests a return to the Forges-Barany approach of universal
mechanisms in the quest of understanding correlation without mediation.
2 Implementation
2.1 The Game
Consider the two-player non-cooperative game of Chicken as below, in which
each of the two players has two strategies, namely, A and B, with 0 ≤ a < b <
c < d. Let us also assume that b+d < 2c, the importance of which will be made
clear in the next subsection.
A B
A a, a d, b
B b, d c, c
We shall normalize a = 0, without loss of generality, in the rest of the paper.
This game has two pure Nash equilibria, namely, (A,B) and (B,A), and a mixed
Nash equilibrium in which each player plays A with probability ρ = (d−c)b+(d−c) .
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2.2 The Correlated Equilibrium Distribution
For the above game (for fixed values of b, c and d), it will suffice for our purpose
to consider the following wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, a
typical element of which is as follows.
A B
A 0 p1
B p2 p3
where, 0 < pi < 1, for i = 1, 2, 3, and
3P
i=1
pi = 1.
It is easy to check that, for the above distribution to be a correlated equi-
librium, we must have bp2 + cp3 ≥ dp3 and bp1 + cp3 ≥ dp3, i.e., we must have
ρp1 + p2 ≥ ρ and p1 + ρp2 ≥ ρ, where ρ = (d−c)b+(d−c) .
A correlated equilibrium as above will be denoted by p, while the set of all
such correlated equilibrium distributions will be denoted by P . The (expected)
payoffs for two players from any p ∈ P are given by u1(p) = dp1+ bp2+ cp3 and
u2(p) = bp1 + dp2 + cp3, respectively.
One may consider the correlated equilibrium distribution that maximizes
the sum of the expected payoffs, called the utilitarian correlated equilibrium
distribution. Clearly, if b + d ≥ 2c, then any convex combination of the two
pure Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game generates the utilitarian correlated
equilibrium distribution with the sum of the expected payoffs b+ d. Under the
assumption that b+ d < 2c, we have the following.
Lemma 1 Under the assumption that b + d < 2c, the utilitarian correlated
equilibrium distribution of the game is p∗ ∈ P where p∗3 = 1−ρ1+ρ =
b
b+2(d−c) and
p∗1 = p∗2 =
1−p∗3
2 , i.e., the utilitarian correlated equilibrium distribution of the
game is
A B
A 0 1−p
∗
3
2
B 1−p
∗
3
2 p
∗
3
where p∗3 = 1−ρ1+ρ =
b
b+2(d−c) .
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Proof. Consider the (constrained maximization) problem of maximizing the
sum of the expected payoffs, (b+ d)(p1 + p2) + 2cp3 subject to the constraints,
ρp1 + p2 ≥ ρ and p1 + ρp2 ≥ ρ, where ρ = (d−c)b+(d−c) . Note that the maximand is
equal to 2c− (p1 + p2)(2c− (b+ d)) and therefore the maximization problem is
equivalent to minimizing (p1+p2)(2c−(b+d)) subject to the above constraints.
It is now easy to check that the solution of the above problem is p1 = p2 = ρ1+ρ
and thus p3 = 1−ρ1+ρ . Hence, the utilitarian correlated equilibrium distribution is
as proposed: p∗3 = 1−ρ1+ρ =
b
b+2(d−c) and p∗1 = p∗2 =
1−p∗3
2 .
We also observe the following.
Lemma 2 Under the assumption that b+d < 2c, for any correlated equilibrium
distribution p ∈ P , p3 ≤ p∗3 = 1−ρ1+ρ =
b
b+2(d−c) .
Proof. Consider any correlated equilibrium distribution p ∈ P . Recall that
the sum of the expected payoffs is (b+d)(p1+p2)+2cp3 = (b+d)(1−p3)+2cp3.
Suppose if possible, p3 > p∗3. Then, as b+d < 2c, the sum of the expected payoffs
for p becomes higher than that for p∗, which is a contradiction to Lemma 1.
Hence the proof.
2.3 The Implementation Problem
Suppose the two players are interested in playing the game according to a par-
ticular correlated equilibrium distribution, such as the utilitarian equilibrium
(or any other distribution p ∈ P ). They would like to achieve it, though, as the
unique Nash equilibrium outcome of a mechanism that does not contemplate
correlation devices. Their problem can then be formulated as an implementation
problem.
For any given game of Chicken, as above, we can define an implementation
problem as follows. Suppose the designer knows the structure of the Chicken
game. However, he does not know the actual payoffs for the two players in the
game. Alternatively, suppose the design of the mechanism is made by the two
players themselves, who are interested in a mechanism that “works” in order
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to implement the desired distribution for any chicken game. A mechanism
is a pair G = ((M1,M2), g), where Mi is player i’s set of messages, and g :
M1 ×M2 7→ Q is an outcome function. (Here, Q denotes the unit simplex over
{(A,A), (A,B), (B,A), (B,B)}.)
A payoff profile (not to be used by the mechanism designer, who specifies
only outcomes) < is described by three numbers,
< = {(b, c, d) | 0 < b < c < d, b+ d < 2c}.
An outcome in this implementation problem, denoted by q, is a probability
distribution over the four pure outcomes of the game. We shall use the notation
below. Q is the set of all such probability distributions.
A B
A 1− q1 − q2 − q3 q1
B q2 q3
The players’ payoffs (under a profile <) from an outcome q ∈ Q, are simply
the expected payoffs with respect to the probability distribution q and are given
by u<1 (q) = dq1 + bq2 + cq3 and u<2 (q) = bq1 + dq2 + cq3, respectively. The
preference over q ∈ Q for each player i (i = 1, 2) is denoted by º<i , under <,
which clearly is defined as, q º<i q0 if and only if, u<i (q) ≥ u<i (q0) for any q,
q0 ∈ Q. We will denote the game induced by G with preferences ((º<i ))i by
G(<).
A social choice function (SCF) f assigns to each chicken game payoff profile <
an outcome f(<) ∈ Q. An SCF f is said to be Nash implementable if there exists
a mechanism G such that for every <, the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of
G(<) is f(<). The problem that concerns us here is to Nash implement any
fixed SCF f that, for each <, consists of a particular correlated equilibrium
distribution: f(<) = p(<) = p(b, c, d) ∈ P . Recall that, when any p ∈ P is
implemented the players’ payoffs are, respectively, u1(p) = dp1 + bp2 + cp3 and
u2(p) = bp1 + dp2 + cp3.
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3 The Main Result
Maskin (1999) showed that the following monotonicity condition is necessary
for Nash implementation of an SCF. An SCF f satisfies Maskin monotonicity
if whenever q ¹<i f(<) =⇒ q ¹<
0
i f(<), for any q ∈ Q, for i = 1, 2, we have
f(<0) = f(<). We shall now prove that no social choice function that assigns
p(<) = p(b, c, d) ∈ P satisfies the Maskin monotonicity condition. Therefore,
no such SCF can be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1 No social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equi-
librium distribution p ∈ P satisfies Maskin monotonicity. Therefore, it cannot
be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For a fixed game of Chicken, let us first fix a particular social
choice function given by f(<) = p(<) = p(b, c, d) ∈ P . Let us denote the
corresponding probability of outcome (B,B) by p3(b, c, d). Recall from Lemma
2 that, p3(b, c, d) ≤ p∗3(b, c, d) = bb+2(d−c) , for any such (b, c, d). To check the
Maskin monotonicity condition, we need to consider two profiles such that their
lower contour sets are nested and then look at the outcomes that the social
choice function chooses at these two profiles.
To prove our result, we shall show that there exists a pair of profiles <
({(b, c, d) | 0 < b < c < d and b+ d < 2c}) and its corresponding p(b, c, d), and
<0 ({(b0, c0, d0) | 0 < b0 < c0 < d0 and b0 + d0 < 2c0}) with its p(b0, c0, d0), such
that the lower contour sets are nested, and however, p(b, c, d) 6= p(b0, c0, d0).
To do so, first fix any arbitrary profile <1, given by any arbitrary choice of
(b1, c1, d1) and thereby fix p3(b1, c1, d1). Now choose a b0 < b1 sufficiently small
such that b0b0+2(d1−c1) < p3(b1, c1, d1) (one may do so as
b
b+2(d1−c1) is a decreasing
function in b). Now, choose a c0 and a d0 such that b1− b0 = c1− c0 = d1− d0.
Denote the difference b1 − b0 by δ > 0. Denote the profile associated with the
numbers (b0, c0, d0) by <0.
Consider the lower contour set of f(<0) under <0 which is the set of distri-
butions q ∈ Q such that u1(q) ≤ u1(p(b0, c0, d0)) and u2(q) ≤ u2(p(b0, c0, d0)).
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This lower contour set is characterized by the following two inequalities:
d0q1 + b0q2 + c0q3 ≤ d0p1(b0, c0, d0) + b0p2(b0, c0, d0) + c0p3(b0, c0, d0) (1)
and
b0q1 + d0q2 + c0q3 ≤ b0p1(b0, c0, d0) + d0p2(b0, c0, d0) + c0p3(b0, c0, d0) (2)
Now take any q in the lower contour set of f(<0) under <1, i.e., with u1(q) ≤
u1(p(b0, c0, d0)) and u2(q) ≤ u2(p(b0, c0, d0)) under <1. This lower contour set
is characterized by the following two inequalities:
d1q1 + b1q2 + c1q3 ≤ d1p1(b0, c0, d0) + b1p2(b0, c0, d0) + c1p3(b0, c0, d0),
i.e., d0q1 + b0q2 + c0q3 + δ(q1 + q2 + q3)
≤ d0p1(b0, c0, d0) + b0p2(b0, c0, d0) + c0p3(b0, c0, d0) + δ
3X
i=1
pi(b0, c0, d0)
i.e., d0q1 + b0q2 + c0q3
≤ d0p1(b0, c0, d0) + b0p2(b0, c0, d0) + c0p3(b0, c0, d0) + δ(1− q1 − q2 − q3)
(3)
and
b1q1 + d1q2 + c1q3 ≤ b1p1(b0, c0, d0) + d1p2(b0, c0, d0) + c1p3(b0, c0, d0),
i.e., b0q1 + d0q2 + c0q3 + δ(q1 + q2 + q3)
≤ b0p1(b0, c0, d0) + d0p2(b0, c0, d0) + c0p3(b0, c0, d0) + δ
3X
i=1
pi(b0, c0, d0)
i.e., b0q1 + d0q2 + c0q3
≤ b0p1(b0, c0, d0) + d0p2(b0, c0, d0) + c0p3(b0, c0, d0) + δ(1− q1 − q2 − q3)
(4)
Clearly, any q in the lower contour set of f(<0) under <0 (satisfying the inequal-
ities 1 and 2) is also in the lower contour set of f(<0) under <1 (satisfying the
inequalities 3 and 4). Thus, the lower contour sets of f(<0) for these profiles
are nested.
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However, for Maskin monotonicity to be satisfied, we must have p(b1, c1, d1) =
p(b0, c0, d0). To show that this is not true, recall that by our choice of b0,
b0
b0+2(d1−c1) < p3(b1, c1, d1). Also, by our choices of c0 and d0, p
∗
3(b0, c0, d0) =
b0
b0+2(d0−c0) =
b0
b0+2(d1−c1) < p3(b1, c1, d1). Finally, from Lemma 2, we have,
p3(b0, c0, d0) ≤ p∗3(b0, c0, d0). Hence, p3(b0, c0, d0) < p3(b1, c1, d1). Thus, such a
social choice function does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity and therefore cannot
be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.
4 Remarks
In this short note, we have argued that the recent literature that considers the
problem of implementing a specific correlated equilibrium distribution, rather
than the whole set of correlated equilibrium distributions, is flawed in an im-
portant way, as the corresponding social choice function may not be fully im-
plemented. We have illustrated our point by using a specific game and a wide
class of correlated equilibrium distributions.
Within our set-up, one may still wish to consider subgame-perfect imple-
mentation to implement a correlated equilibrium distribution as the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of a suitably constructed extensive game
form.
Also, as is well-known, under very mild conditions, any social choice function
can be virtually Nash implemented in the sense that it is possible to implement
an outcome that is arbitrarily close to the desired one (Abreu and Matsushima
(1992), Abreu and Sen (1991), Matsushima (1988)). Virtual implementation is
possible if and only if the condition ‘non-empty intersection of lower contour
sets’ is met. In our context, it is indeed met as we have the outcome (a, a) in
the Chicken game. One could thus try to construct a mechanism that will give
rise to virtual implementation. This kind of approximation would then provide
a way out to the difficulty pointed out here.
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